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SMOKING GUNS, STRAY REMARKS, AND NOT MUCH
IN BETWEEN: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE

FEDERAL CIRCUITS' INCONSISTENT APPLICATION
OF THE DIRECT EVIDENCE REQUIREMENT IN

MIXED-MOTIVE EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION
CASES
I. INTRODUCTION
Upon resuming work on a construction project that had previously
been suspended, Costa Brothers Masonry, Inc. chose not to rehire all of the
workers it had laid off during the suspension.' All dark-skinned Cape
Verdean workers, including Henry Fernandes, were among those that the
company chose not to rehire. 2 Fernandes and his co-workers filed suit
against Costa Brothers, claiming that the company refused to rehire them
because of their nationality and skin color. The complaint alleged that
only white and light-skinned Portuguese workers were rehired, while dark
skinned Cape Verdeans were not.4 The plaintiffs further asserted that in
refusing to rehire them, the employer stated: "I don't need minorities, I
don't need no residents on this job," and "I don't have to hire you locals or

1 Fernandes v. Costa Bros. Masonry, Inc., 199 F.3d 572, 578 (1st Cir. 1999). Costa
Brothers Masonry, Inc. was hired as a subcontractor for a publicly-funded construction
project. Id. at 577. Because the project was publicly-funded, Costa Brothers had to
conform to Equal Employment Opportunity standards in hiring its workers. Id. At the start
of work, Costa Brothers hired employees of multiple nationalities and color. Id. at 578.
Costa Brothers later suspended the project and laid off its workers due to a heating problem
and winter weather conditions. Id. Subsequent to resuming work on the project, Costa
Brothers called 18 laid-off workers back to work and hired 10 new workers. Id. All
twenty-eight of these workers were white. Id.
2 Id.
3 Id. at 577-79.
Fernandes and his co-workers repeatedly returned to the
construction site to request work. Id. at 578-79. Fernandes and his co-workers observed
that no dark-skinned Cape Verdean men had returned to work, that none were newly hired,
and only white workers and light-skinned Portuguese workers were on the job. Id. at 57879.
4 Id. at 579. When Fernandes asked why he and his fellow Cape Verdean co-workers
were not rehired, his former employer replied that the company "had only hired a few
minorities because of local pressure." Id. at 578-59. Fernandes was eventually rehired after
putting considerable pressure on Costa Brothers, but was fired again after being constantly
harassed by his supervisor. Id. at 579.
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Cape Verdean people."' 5 Despite this strong evidence supporting a claim of
employment discrimination, both the District Court and the Court of
Appeals for the First Circuit found that there was insufficient evidence to
warrant a finding for the plaintiffs.6 Holding for the defendant, both courts
found that the plaintiffs could not prevail on their mixed-motive claim of
employment discrimination because they did not produce direct evidence
of the alleged discrimination.7
The plaintiffs in Fernandes v. Costa Bros. Masonry, Inc.8 stand
among countless employment discrimination plaintiffs who have been
denied relief because of the "direct evidence" requirement. 9 This infamous
concept, first developed by Justice O'Connor's seminal concurrence in
Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 10 has not only proved to be a frustrating
5 Id. at 578-79.
6 Fernandes, 199 F.3d at 579, 583. The District Court, undertaking only a pretext

analysis, did not consider the mixed-motive framework when granting the defendant's
motion for summary judgment. Id. at 579. The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit
undertook both the mixed-motive and pretext analysis. Id. at 583. The court found that the
evidence presented by the plaintiffs did not rise to direct evidence and, therefore, did not
open the door to the mixed-motive framework. Id. The court did find, however, that
sufficient evidence existed to enable the plaintiffs to proceed on their claim under the
pretext analysis. Id. at 583. The court remanded for further proceedings and noted that it is
possible that the plaintiffs could adduce additional evidence at trial which would allow the
district court to conclude that a mixed-motive jury instruction is appropriate. Id.
7 Id. at 583-84 (finding biased statements made by employer did not directly reflect
alleged animus).
s 199 F.3d 572 (1st Cir. 1999).
9 See Fernandes 199 F.3d at ,83 (finding no direct evidence); Taylor v. Va. Union
Univ., 193 F.3d 219 (4th Cir. 1999) (finding employer's statement did not bear on contested
employment decision, therefore did not constitute direct evidence); Haas v. ADVO
Systems, Inc., 168 F.3d 732 (5th Cir. 1999) (characterizing decisionmaker's statements as
indirect and inferential, therefore not direct evidence); Shorter v. ICG Holdings, Inc., 188
F.3d 1204 (10th Cir. 1999) (holding supervisor's statements reflected personal bias, not
direct evidence of discrimination); see also, Carter v. Three Springs Resid. Treatment, 132
F.3d 635 (11 th Cir. 1998) (viewing decisionmaker's statements as susceptible to more than
one interpretation, therefore not constituting direct evidence); Walden v. Georgia-Pacific
Corp., 126 F.3d 506 (3d Cir. 1997) (finding remarks by employees outside chain of
decisionmakers, therefore not direct evidence); Raskin v. Wyatt Co., 125 F.3d 55 (2d Cir.
1997) (holding plaintiff did not meet burden of showing protected classification played part
in decisionmaking process); see also, Fields v. N.Y. State Office of Mental Retardation &
Developmental Disabilities, 115 F.3d 116 (2d Cir. 1997) (finding evidence offered by
plaintiff did not tie directly to discriminatory animus); Smith v. F.W. Morse & Co., Inc., 76
F.3d 413 (1st Cir. 1996) (concluding evidence supported District Court finding that
employer would have eliminated employee absent discriminatory motive); Ayala-Gerena v.
Bristol Myers-Squibb Co., 95 F.3d 86 (1st Cir. 1996) (finding statements made by
decisionmaker constitute stray remarks, not linked to adverse employment decision); see
also, Fuller v. Phipps, 67 F.3d 1137 (4th Cir. 1995) (holding plaintiff's statistical evidence
does not merit mixed-motive jury instruction); Jackson v. Harvard Univ., 900 F.2d 464 (1st
Cir. 1990) (finding plaintiff did not present direct evidence, therefore loses on mixedmotive claim).
'0 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
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barrier to compensation for plaintiffs legitimately suffering from
discriminatory treatment in the employment setting, but has also caused
conflict among the courts as well.iX Plaintiffs often find it difficult to meet
the burden of proof required by the direct evidence standard, and courts
have found that 2defining the evidentiary burden is a complicated and
challenging task. 1
This Note examines the division that has developed among the
federal circuits over defining and applying the direct evidence
requirement. !3
Focusing on claims involving individual disparate
treatment in the employment setting, this Note begins with an analysis of
the frameworks available to plaintiffs alleging that they have suffered from
employment discrimination. 14 Using a scheme developed by Judge Selya
of the First Circuit in Fernandes, this Note will examine how the circuit
split has arisen in the wake of Justice O'Connor's call for a direct evidence
requirement in mixed-motive cases. 15 Part II discusses the individual
disparate treatment claim, the mixed-motive framework, and the
development of the direct evidence requirement.16 Part III examines the
three approaches used by the federal circuits to interpret and enforce the
direct evidence requirement 17 and shows that, after careful consideration of
the tremendous impact the direct evidence requirement has on employment
discrimination plaintiffs, the First Circuit has found that a more relaxed
approach is necessary. 18 Arguing that the First Circuit's approach is a
model under which the Supreme Court should unify the courts, Part IV
presents a critical analysis of the strictest interpretations of direct evidence

11 See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 261-79 (1989) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring) (establishing direct evidence requirement in mixed-motive cases); see also,
Fernandes, 199 F.3d 572, 581-82 (discussing circuit conflict, difficulty in defining direct
evidence, and effect of requirement on plaintiff's case).
12 See Fernandes, 199 F.3d at 581-83 (detailing conflict, describing problems
resulting from requirement).
13 See id. (enumerating differing positions taken by each circuit).
14 See id. (describing different approaches to legal frameworks in employment
discrimination cases);

MICHAEL J. ZIMMER, CHARLES A. SULLIVAN, RICHARD F. RICHARDS
& DEBORAH A. CALLOWAY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION

(Aspen Publishers, Inc., 5th ed. 2000) [hereinafter CASES AND MATERIALS] (describing and
explaining various legal frameworks applied to employment discrimination claims).
15 See Fernandes, 199 F.3d at 581-83 (analyzing circuit split); see also, Price
Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 261-79 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (establishing direct evidence

requirement).

See generally CASES AND MATERIALS, supra note 14.
See Fernandes, 199 F.3d at 579-84 (elucidating circuit positions).
18 Compare Febres v. Challenger Caribbean Corp., 214 F.3d 57 (1st Cir. 2000)
16
17

(rejecting narrow definitions of direct evidence, favoring more measured approach), with
Smith v. F.W. Morse & Co., Inc., 76 F.3d 413 (1st Cir. 1996) (defining direct evidence
narrowly), and Jackson v. Harvard Univ., 900 F.2d 464 (1st Cir. 1990) (adopting strictest
definition of direct evidence).
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and concludes that the First Circuit offers a correctly measured approach to
a poorly developed evidentiary requirement. 19
II. THE INDIVIDUAL DISPARATE TREATMENT CLAIM, THE
MIXED MOTIVES FRAMEWORK, AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF
JUSTICE O'CONNOR'S DIRECT EVIDENCE REQUIREMENT
In Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,20 Congress established
that it is unlawful for employers to discriminate against employees or
prospective employees based on "such individual's race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin."' 21 Since the establishment of Title VII, Congress
has enacted other statutes to protect people from employment
discrimination based on their age and disability status and to establish the
rights of all citizens to "make and enforce contracts," including the
employment contract. 2 These statutes have, in turn, spawned a substantial
amount of case law that has set specific guidelines for a plaintiff bringing
an employment discrimination claim under federal law. 23 Each of the
employment discrimination statutes has recognized one or more of the
various forms in which discrimination manifests, including: individual
disparate treatment, which involves treating an individual differently based
on a protected characteristic; systemic disparate treatment, which involves
treating a group of people differently based on a shared protected
characteristic; and systemic disparate impact, which involves an
employer's policy or actions that, though not discriminatory on their face,
impact on a group of people with a shared protected
have a discriminatory
characteristic. 24 Accordingly, a plaintiff bringing forth an employment
discrimination case faces different methods and burdens of proof according
to the type of discrimination that s/he has suffered from. 5

19See Febres v. Challenger Caribbean Corp., 214 F.3d 57 (1st Cir. 2000) (using
several factors to take more measured approach toward direct evidence requirement).
20 42 U.S.C. § 2000e to 2000e-17 (1981).
21 Id.

22 See 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 631-634 (West 1985) (codifying Age Discrimination in
Employment Act); 42 U.S.C.A. § 1981 (West 1994) (codifying Civil War Reconstruction
Statute); 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 12111-12117, §§12131-12134 (West 1993) (codifying Americans
with Disabilities Act of 1990).
23 See generally CASES AND MATERIALS, supra note 14.
24 See generally id.
25 See generally id.
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A. Individual DisparateTreatment Under the McDonnell Douglas
Framework

By the early 1980's, the Supreme Court settled the burden of proof
required in individual disparate treatment employment discrimination cases
with a clear and concise burden-shifting process developed in McDonnell
27
Douglas Corporation v. Green. In McDonnell Douglas, the Court held
that even without direct evidence of discrimination, such as facially
discriminatory policies or statements, a plaintiff can prove through
inference that an employer has set up "artificial, arbitrary, and unnecessary
barriers to employment. ' 28 The federal circuits have been unified in
applying this approach to cases brought before them involving individual
disparate treatment employment discrimination.29
In 1989, however,
the
McDonnell Douglas ceased to be the only approach to such cases when
30
Supreme Court delivered its opinion in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins.

26

See McDonnell Douglas Corporation v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973) (establishing

framework for individual disparate treatment claim).
27 McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973). McDonnell Douglas established
that, in order to establish a prima facie case, plaintiffs must show "(i) that [they] belong to a
[protected class]; (ii) that [they] applied/[were fired] and [were] qualified for a job for
which the employer was seeking/ [continued to seek for] applicants; (iii) that, despite [their]
qualifications, they [were] rejected/[fired] and, after their rejection/ [termination], ...the
employer continued to seek applicants.., with [their] qualifications." Id. Once a plaintiff has
established a prima facie case, the burden then shifts to the employer, who must present a
legitimate non-discriminatory reason for rejecting or terminating the plaintiff. Id. If the
employer can do this, the burden shifts back to the plaintiff, who must prove that the
emploer's reason is pretextual. Id.
Id. at 801, 804-05. Under this precept, if the jury finds that plaintiffs have
established both that the employer's stated legitimate reasons are pretextual and that the
employer intentionally discriminated against them, the plaintiffs prevail on their claim. See
St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 508-12 (1993) (discussing pretext component
of legal framework); McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802 (detailing burden-shifting
process). The jury must find for the plaintiff on both of those factors, otherwise the
employer prevails. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 511. In St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, the Court
explained that additional proof of discrimination is not required once the jury decides the
defendant's proferred reasons were pretext. Id. at 511. However, the Court clarified that a
finding of pretext does not compel a judgment for the plaintiff. Id. Instead, the Hicks Court
emphasized that the ultimate burden of persuasion remains with the plaintiff and, therefore,
intentional discrimination must be proven along with a finding of pretext. Id. Significantly,
the Court also clarified that "the factfinder's disbelief of the reasons put forward by the
defendant (particularly if disbelief is accompanied by a suspicion of mendacity) may,
together with the elements of the prima facie case, suffice to show intentional
discrimination." Id. at 510-11.
29 See Fernandes, 199 F.3d at 572, 580 (discussing application of individual disparate
treatment framework by federal circuits). The Fernandes court stated that plaintiffs may
use the Price Waterhouse framework if putting forth direct evidence, otherwise they must
proceed under the McDonnell Douglas/pretext framework in all other cases. Id.
30490 U.S. 228 (1989).
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B. Individual DisparateTreatment Under the Price Waterhouse )
Framework

In 1982, the partners of Price Waterhouse, a professional accounting
firm, submitted Anne Hopkins's name as a candidate for partnership. 2
After interviewing other partners in the firm and reviewing the partners'
comments submitted in favor of or against granting Hopkins partnership,
the firm decided to place Hopkins's candidacy on hold to be reconsidered
the following year.33 After reconsideration, the decision was, again, to put
Hopkins on hold.34
The partner who delivered the news to Hopkins informed her that
"inorder to improve her chances for partnership, Hopkins should 'walk
more femininely, talk more femininely, dress more femininely, wear makeup, have her hair styled, and wear jewelry."' 35 Hopkins sued Price
Waterhouse under Title VII, charging that discriminatory animus based on
her sex influenced the firm's adverse employment decision not to offer her
the partnership position.36 Following a close examination of the facts, the
District Court found that "Price Waterhouse had unlawfully discriminated
against Hopkins on the basis of sex by consciously giving credence and
effect to partners' comments resulting from sex stereotyping. '37 The
Appeals Court affirmed but also added, "even if a plaintiff proves that
31 Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. 228 (establishing framework different from previously
established pretext framework).
32 Id. at 232.
33Id. at 233.
34Id.
31Id. at 235.
36 Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 232. Trial testimony revealed that, as part of the
evaluation process, the firm relied on sexist and disparaging comments concerning Anne
Hopkins's lack of femininity and aggressive personality. Id. at 235-36; see also, infra note
37.
37Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 237. Sexual stereotyping comments made by the
partners included describing her as "macho," suggesting that she "overcompensated for
being a woman," advising her to "take a course in charm school," and objecting to her
swearing, reasoning that a lady should not use foul language. Id. at 234-35. Significantly,
the trial court considered Hopkins's lack of ability to maintain good personal relations with
her support staff, which was also one of the employer's stated reasons for the adverse
decision, to be a permissible factor to take into account in the employer's decision-making
process. Id. at 236. Partners commented that Hopkins was sometimes abrasive with staff
members, and indicated that she was "sometimes overly aggressive, unduly harsh, difficult
to work with, and impatient with staff." Id. at 234-35. The court concluded, however, that
the firm was still liable for allowing discrimination to be any part of the decision, even
though discrimination may not have been the only motivation. Id. at 236-37. The Court
reiterated the lower court's finding that, although the firm proffered legitimate reasons for
its decision not to promote Hopkins, it nonetheless "discriminated against Hopkins on the
basis of sex by consciously giving credence and effect to partners' comments that resulted
from sex stereotyping." Id.
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discrimination played a role in an employment decision, the defendant will
not be found liable if it proves, by clear and convincing evidence, that it
would have made the same decision in the absence of discrimination., 38
Upon reviewing the various issues presented in the Price Waterhouse case,
the Supreme Court of the United States granted Certiorari.39
Disagreeing with the "clear and convincing" burden of proof placed
upon the defendant, but agreeing with the essence of the Appeals Court
holding, a plurality of the Supreme Court firmly established the new
burden shifting process that is now required when presenting a "mixedmotives" case.4° The Court clarified that the "mixed-motives" framework
differs substantially from the well-established "pretext" framework of
McDonnell Douglas.4 1 The mixed-motive framework applies when the
evidence shows that the employer considered both a proscribed factor,
such as nationality, and a legitimate factor, such as competency. 42 The
weight that the employer placed on each factor does not affect the outcome
of the case.43 The Price Waterhouse plurality held that as long as the
plaintiff proves a proscribed factor played a motivating part in thean
employment decision, the burden of persuasion shifts to the employer.
Employers are held liable unless they can prove the same decision would
have been made had the proscribed factor not been taken into account.45
Subsequently, the Civil Rights Act of 1991 altered the framework
established by the Price Waterhouse plurality.46 Congress mandated in the
1991 Act that employees are still entitled to equitable relief so long as they
prove a proscribed factor played any part in the decision-making process.47
" Id. at 237.
39 See generally id
40 See id. at 237, 246-50 (defining mixed-motives employment decision as product
of
both legitimate and illegitimate motives). The McDonnell Douglas analysis requires the
judge or jury to decide whether or not the employer's proffered legitimate reason was the
only true reason. Id. at 247; McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 800-05. The mixed-motive
approach, on the other hand, allows the judge or jury to find that the employer had both
legitimate and illegitimate motives for the employment decision. Price Waterhouse, 490
U.S. at 237, 246-50. The employer is liable if any of his/her motives was discriminatory in
nature, even if the discriminatory motive is accompanied by legitimate business reasons. Id.
41 Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 246-47; McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 800-05.
42 Fernandes, 199 F.3d at 572, 580.
43 See id. (stating burden of persuasion shifts to employer once plaintiff proves
proscribed factor motivated decision).
44 Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 242, 244-45. Once the burden shifts to the
defendant, "the defendant may avoid a finding of liability only by proving that it would
have made the same decision even if it had not allowed [the proscribed factor] to play such
a role." Id. at 244-45.
45 Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 244-45.
46 See generally 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2 (West 1991).
47 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2(m). The statute provides, in pertinent part, "an unlawful
employment practice is established when the complaining party demonstrates that [a
proscribed factor] was a motivating factor for any employment practice, even though other
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Employers, therefore, no longer completely escape liability, even if they
can prove they would have made the same decision regardless of the
proscribed factor.48
C. The CircuitSplit Over the Mixed-Motive Framework

Employment discrimination plaintiffs have the choice of framing
their case under the pretext or mixed-motive approach, or both, but it is up
to the courts to determine whether the plaintiff has a case that can be tried
within the chosen framework. 49 The process of deciding whether to apply
the McDonnell Douglas or Price Waterhouse framework has caused a

substantial rift among the federal circuit courts. 50 The source of this circuit
split is Justice O'Connor's Price Waterhouse concurrence, which
established that plaintiffs must produce "direct evidence" to gain access to
the mixed-motive framework. 5'
Justice O'Connor declared that, in order to prevail under the mixedmotive formula, direct evidence is required to show that an employer relied
on discriminatory factors in reaching a decision.52 This standard is very
difficult for a plaintiff to meet due to the fact that direct evidence is such a
rare occurrence. 53 Employers are aware of the legal consequences of
perpetrating blatantly unlawful discrimination and, therefore, use subtle
and deceitful tactics in carrying out their ultimately discriminatory
objectives.
Further, the only light that Justice O'Connor shed on the
term's definition was what cannot be considered as direct evidence.55 The
factors also motivated the practice." Id.
48 See id.
49 Fernandes, 199 F.3d at 572, 581. "...the trial court, at an appropriate stage of the
litigation, will channel the case into one format or the other." Id. The Fernandes court
noted that courts "make that determination based on the availability or unavailability of
direct evidence." Id.
50 See id. at 579-84 (explaining available analytical methods utilized by circuits to
determine which framework applies).
31 Price Waterhouse,490 U.S. 228, 261-79 (1989) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
52 Id. at 277 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice O'Connor established that stray
remarks can be probative of illegal conduct, but do not justify "requiring the employer to
prove that its [employment] decisions were based on legitimate criteria." Id. The majority
held that the equal employment opportunity statute did not embody a causal requirement.
Id. at 277-78. Conversely, under Justice O'Connor's approach, "the plaintiff must produce
evidence sufficient to show that an illegitimate criterion was a substantial factor in the
particular employment decision, such that a reasonable factfinder could draw an inference
that the decision was made 'because of' the plaintiffs protected status." Id. at 278.
53 See Fernandes, 199 F.3d at 580 (recognizing the rarety of direct evidence).
The
court recognized that "[blecause discrimination tends more and more to operate in subtle
ways, direct evidence is relatively rare..."Id.
54 See id. (noting discrimination operates in subtle ways).
55 Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. 228, 277 (1989) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
Justice
O'Connor stated that "stray remarks, statements by non-decision makers, or statements
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minimal groundwork laid by Justice O'Connor in Price Waterhouse has
proven to be the catalyst for the varying definitions and applications of the
requirement.56
A number of the circuits have chosen to strictly apply the direct
evidence standard by excluding any evidence that makes it necessary to
draw inferences, which includes a total exclusion of evidence that can be
characterized as circumstantial.57 In contrast, other circuits "do not
distinguish between direct and circumstantial evidence but, rather,
emphasize that the mixed-motive trigger depends on the strength of the
plaintiff's case. '58 A third grouip of circuits merely require that the
evidence, which can be direct or circumstantial, "is tied to the alleged
discriminatory animus and need not bear squarely on the challenged
employment decision. ' 59 The confusion among the circuits has resulted in
the inconsistent application of federal law under the various antidiscrimination statutes.60
The courts have found the job of defining exactly what the direct
evidence requirement necessitates to be the most challenging task of all.61
The courts' dilemma is twofold: first, they are in a state of confusion over
the standard of evidence that must exist to establish a mixed-motives case,
and second, they have not ascertained a clear and uniform definition for the
term "direct evidence. ' 62
Many judges maintain that the only
distinguishing factor that is applicable when deciding between the
McDonnell Douglas and Price Waterhouse framework is the quality of
evidence the plaintiff can produce.63 Other judges assert that the most
important distinguishing factor is that pretext cases involve only one true
reason for the adverse employment decision, while mixed-motive cases
involve an employer who has multiple reasons, at least one of them being

made by decision makers unrelated to the decisional process itself," are not direct evidence.

Id.

56 See Fernandes, 199 F.3d at 582-83 (describing 'available analytical methods).
57 See id. at 582 (describing classic position).

58 See id. (describing animus plus position).
59 See id. (describing animus position).

60 See id. at 579-84 (discussing varying applications of direct evidence requirement).

61 See id. at 581-82
(observing jurists struggle to define direct evidence
affirmatively).
62 See id. The Fernandescourt noted that courts follow Justice O'Connor's example
of what is not direct evidence, but cannot establish a universally accepted affirmative
definition of the term. Id. at 581.
63 See, e.g., Shorter v. ICG Holdings Inc., 188 F.3d 1204, 1207-08
(10th Cir. 1999)
(holding without direct evidence, plaintiff must proceed under pretext framework); Carter v.
Three Springs Residential Treatment, 132 F.3d 635, 642 (1 Ith Cir. 1998) (holding evidence
requiring inferential leap between fact and conclusion leads to pretext framework); Nichols
v. Loral Vought Systems Corp., 81 F.3d 38, 40-41 (5th Cir. 1996) (holding if evidence
cannot prove existence of fact without inference, must proceed under pretext framework).
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discriminatory animus. 64 The latter group of judges find that plaintiffs in
both situations should be allowed to present both direct and circumstantial
evidence to prove their cases. 65 The former group of judges require
nothing less than a confession from the employer before awarding a
plaintiff the mixed-motive jury instruction. 66
Judge Selya of the First Circuit recognized and analyzed this
quandary in Fernandes.67 Judge Selya observed that if the mixed-motive
approach is not limited to a particular set of facts, it has the potential to
"swallow whole the traditional McDonnell Douglas pretext analysis." 68
Judge Selya pointed out that because of this threat, the First Circuit has
restricted its applicability to cases in which a plaintiff can present
sufficient evidence that leads to a "high degree of assurance that the
employment decision was the product of a mixture of legitimate and
illegitimate motives., 69 Therefore, access to the mixed-motive formula has
historically depended only on the quality of the available evidence.7 ° In
order to make sense of the various approaches applied by the circuits,
Judge Selya described three schools of thought that have emerged in the
case law generated since Price Waterhouse: the "classic" position, the
"animus plus" position, and the "animus" position. 7'
III. THE CIRCUIT DIVISION OVER THE DIRECT EVIDENCE
REQUIREMENT

A. The "Classic" Position
Circuits that take the classic position to applying Justice
O'Connor's direct evidence requirement adhere to the literal definition of
direct evidence as "evidence which, if believed, proves the existence of a
fact in issue without inference or presumption. 7 2 These circuits hold that
64

See, e.g., Thomas v. Nat'l Football League Players Ass'n, 131 F.3d 198, 204 (D.C.

Cir. 1997) (holding no bar on using circumstantial or inferential evidence to shift burden
under mixed-motive framework); Miller v. Cigna Corp., 47 F.3d 586, 592 (3rd Cir. 1995)
(stating critical inquiry whether protected characteristic any factor in employment decision);
Ostrowski v. Atlantic Mut. Ins., 968 F.2d 171 (2nd Cir. 1992) (finding Price Waterhouse
framework applies where employment decision based on forbidden and permissible
motives).
65 See cases cited supra note
64.
66 See cases cited supra note 63.
67 Fernandes, 199 F.3d at 580-84.
68 Id. at 580.
69

id.

70

Id.

71
72

Id.
Shorter v. ICG Holdings, Inc., 188 F.3d 1204, 1207 (10th Cir. 1999) (quoting

BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 460 (6th ed. 1990)); see also, e.g., Nichols v. Loral Vought Sys.
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this type of evidence is in stark contrast to circumstantial evidence, which
requires the factfinder to infer a discriminatory motive from the evidence
presented.73 The Tenth Circuit has stated that direct evidence of personal
bias is not equivalent to direct evidence of discrimination.7 4 Under this
theory, the classic circuits adopt the notion that a mixed-motive instruction

is not automatically triggered where the trier of fact may conclude that the
evidence yields both forbidden and permissible motives.75 Instead, these

circuits require not only that a mixture of motives be involved, but also that
the forbidden motive was a primary motivation in the employment
decision.76
Corp., 81 F.3d 38, 40 (5th Cir. 1996); Troupe v. May Dep't Stores Co., 20 F.3d 734, 736
(7th Cir. 1994); BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 460 (6th ed. 1990).
73 Shorter, 188 F.3d at 1207. The Tenth Circuit, which frequently applies the classic
position, asserts that "statements of personal opinion, even when reflecting a personal bias
or prejudice, do not constitute direct evidence of discrimination." Id. (quoting EEOC v.
Wiltel, Inc., 81 F.3d 1508, 1514 (10th Cir. 1996) (emphasis added)).
74 Shorter, 188 F.3d at 1207. The Shorter court held that statements made by a
supervisor such as "[expletive] women, I hate having [expletive] women in the office," do
not constitute direct evidence of discrimination. Id. Rather, the court classified such
statements as "[a]t most.. .indirect or circumstantial evidence of discrimination..." Id. The
court would not classify such statements as direct evidence "...because a trier of fact would
have to infer that the bias reflected in the statements was the reason behind the adverse
emplo 'ment decision." Id.
4 See Thomas v. Denny's, Inc., 111 F.3d 1506, 1512 (10th Cir. 1997) (finding
employer's reasons must be pretext and not part of motivating factors).
76 See id. The Thomas court found that the Price Waterhouse framework does not
come into play "until the plaintiff has carried the burden of persuading the [factfinderl that
the forbidden animus was a motivating factor," and that the non-discriminatory reasons
given by the employer "were pretexts and not also motivating factors." Id. (emphasis
added). Notably, the Tenth Circuit made a significant departure from the classic position in
Medlock v. Ortho Biotech, Inc., wherein the court held that a plaintiff may prevail using the
"direct method" of proving discrimination with direct or circumstantial evidence. Medlock
v. Ortho Biotech, Inc., 164 F.3d 545, 550 (10th Cir. 1999). The Medlock court required only
that the evidence prove that the alleged discriminatory motive "actually relates to the
question of discrimination in the particular employment decision, not to the mere existence
of other, potentially unrelated, forms of discrimination in the workplace." Id. (quoting
Thomas v. NFL Players Ass'n, 131 F.3d 198, 204 (D.C. Cir. 1997)). Eight months after
Medlock, Judge Lucero's dissent in Shorter v. ICG Holdings, Inc. disturbed the Tenth
Circuit's adherence to the classic position. Shorter v. ICG Holdings, Inc., 188 F.3d 1204,
1211-15 (10th Cir. 1999) (Lucero, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). In Shorter, the
plaintiffs supervisor made multiple derogatory remarks to and about the plaintiff
concerning her race. Shorter, 188 F.3d at 1206. While the Shorter majority held that the
supervisor's statements were merely personal opinion and, therefore, not enough to
constitute direct evidence, Judge Lucero challenged the application of summary judgment
on the case. Shorter, 188 F.3d at 1211 (Lucero, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
Stating that summary judgment applies when the evidence leads to only one conclusion,
Judge Lucero found that the facts should have been presented to a jury for evaluation and
conclusion because the employer's motive was genuinely in dispute. Id. According to Judge
Lucero, the court substituted "its own subjective evaluation of the motive," a job which
should have been left up to the jury. Id. Other circuits have also held that if the employee
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The Seventh Circuit, which has applied both the classic and animusplus positions, acknowledged that there is a potential for confusion within
the circuit when framing the issue of direct evidence. 77 In Troupe v. May
Department Stores,78 the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit noted
that the issue is further complicated by the fact that discriminatory intent is
a state of mind. 79 Therefore, when applying the classic position, the
Seventh Circuit concludes that because "mind reading is not an accepted
tool of judicial inquiry," the only true direct evidence of intent that will
ever be available is "acknowledgement of discriminatory intent by the
defendant or its agents." 80
B. The "Animus Plus" Position
The animus-plus position requires a stringent standard, yet the
circuits that adhere to this position are not as inflexible as the classic
circuits. 8 1 Circuits that apply the animus-plus analysis examine the
strength of the evidence presented by plaintiffs to determine whether the
plaintiffs have satisfied their evidentiary burden. 82
Unlike the classic
circuits, animus-plus circuits will consider evidence other than "virtual
83
admissions of illegality.,
While the classic position deems evidence as direct according to a
characterization of the proof, the animus-plus position focuses on the
relationship between the proof and accompanying incidents. 84 The
cast doubts on the employer's proffered reasons for the adverse employment decision, and
if it is a close case on the facts, then the determination of whether or not discrimination was
a motivating factor should be left to the jury. See Sheehan v. Donlen Corp., 173 F.3d 1039,
1046 (7th Cir. 1999) (finding jury should make determination when plaintiff casts doubt on
employer's proffered reasons); Deneen v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 132 F.3d 431, 438 (8th
Cir. 1998) (stating juries should decide close cases).
77 See Troupe v. May Dept. Stores Co., 20 F.3d 734, 736 (7th Cir. 1994)
(acknowledging confusion within circuit). The circuit points out that this confusion is
derived from the fact that different forms of evidence create a triable issue of discrimination
in individual disparate treatment cases, and that it is not clear which types of proof eradicate
the need for inference or presumption. Id.
7' 20 F.3d 734.
79 Troupe, 20 F.3d at 736. The Troupe court noted that "...intent to discriminate is a
mental state and mind reading is not an accepted tool of judicial inquiry..." Id.
80ld.

81 See Fernandes, 199 F.3d at 582 (stating courts endorsing animus plus position do

not distinguish evidence in classic sense).
82 See Kubicko v. Ogden Logistics Services, 181 F.3d 544, 553 (4th Cir. 1999)
(explaining determination of whether plaintiff satisfies evidentiary threshold ultimately
hinges on strength of evidence).
83 Venters v. City of Delphi, 123 F.3d 956, 973 (7th Cir. 1997). According to the
animus-plus approach, evidence may bear directly on a decision without referring to the
decision specifically. Thomas v. NFL Players Ass'n, 131 F.3d 198, 204 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
84 See Venters, 123 F.3d at 973 (clarifying "direct" describes relationship
between
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animus-plus circuits positively define direct evidence as "evidence that the
decisionmakers placed substantial negative reliance on an illegitimate
criterion. ' 85 Similar to the circuits applying the classic position, the
animus-plus circuits find that the plaintiff
must "clear a high hurdle to
' 86
"
instruction.
motive
mixed
a
for
qualify
Animus-plus circuits insist on a high standard because they presume
that the mixed-motive framework is friendlier to the plaintiff than the
McDonnell Douglas pretext framework.87 The reasoning for this belief is
twofold: first, unlike the burden in the pretext framework, plaintiffs using
the mixed-motive approach do not have the burden of proving that
discriminatory animus was the one and only true reason for the
employment decision, but only that it was a substantial factor; second,
plaintiffs do not retain the burden of proof throughout the trial but, rather,
pass it over to the defendant once they have made a showing that "a
discriminatory attitude88was more likely than not a motivating factor in the
employer's decision.
proof and incidents, not characterization of proof). The term animus-plus connotes that
plaintiffs must prove not only that the employer perpetrated discriminatory animus against
them, but also that the animus was directly related to the adverse employment decision. See
Thomas, 131 F.3d at 204 (distinguishing direct evidence from other manifestations of
discrimination in employment, unrelated to employment decision). The Thomas court
clarified that Justice O'Connor's use of the word "direct" "simply distinguishes evidence
that shows that an unlawful consideration constituted a substantial factor in the particular
employment decision from evidence insufficiently related to the particular event." Id. Under
this evidentiary standard, the court does away with the need for inference or presumption by
relying on evidence of discriminatory animus only when it is tied to the employment
decision. Id. The Thomas court emphasized that the court's articulation of the standard
should be read carefully because "evidence may 'bear directly' on a decision without
referring to it specifically." Id. This position is consistent with a plain reading of Justice
O'Connor's negative definition of direct evidence as evidence which does not include
"stray remarks in the workplace... statements by nondecisionmakers, or statements by
decisionmakers unrelated to the decisional process itself." Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at
277 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
85 Kubicko v. Ogden Logistics Services, 181 F.3d 544, 552 (4th Cir. 1999); Walden
v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 126 F.3d 506, 513 (3d Cir. 1997); Fuller v. Phipps, 67 F.3d 1137,
1142 (4th Cir. 1995). In Walden v. Georgia Pacific Corp., the Third Circuit declared that
"the term 'direct evidence' is somewhat of a misnomer." Walden, 126 F.3d at 513. The
Walden court found that circumstantial evidence can be considered direct and may lead to a
mixed-motive jury instruction as long as the "evidence can fairly be said to directly reflect
the alleged unlawful basis for the adverse employment decision." Id.
86 Walden, 126 F.3d at 513.
87 See Walden, 126 F.3d at 513 (demanding plaintiff clear high hurdle); Taylor v. Va.
Union Univ., 193 F.3d 219, 232 (4th Cir. 1999) (describing bonus to plaintiff for using
mixed-motive framework); Fuller v. Phipps, 67 F.3d 1137, 1142 (4th Cir. 1995) (stating
standards of liability in mixed-motive cases more advantageous to plaintiffs); Kubicko v.
Ogden Logistics Services, 181 F.3d 544, 553 (4th Cir. 1999) (describing standard of
liabilitVy in pretext cases as less advantageous to plaintiff).
Walden, 126 F.3d at 513; Miller v. CIGNA Corp., 47 F.3d 586, 593 (3d Cir.
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According to the animus-plus circuits, statements that are vague and
unconnected to a participant in the employment decision, or are remote in
time in relation to the decision, are insufficient to establish a mixed-motive
case.89 Such statements do not satisfy the animus-plus requirement that the
evidence must reflect the discriminatory animus on the part of the
decisionmaker in connection with the employment decision at issue. 9°
Under this theory, even statements made by general decisionmakers are not
considered as direct evidence if there is no evidence linking the statementmaker to the contested decision. 9'
Nonetheless, the Third Circuit has established that people who have
"direct access to the decisionmakers and are likely to influence their
decision" should be considered persons that are part of the decisionmaking
process.92 This assertion is consistent with the Price Waterhouse
decision. 93 The Supreme Court found the employer liable in Price
Waterhouse because the decisionmakers had substantially relied on
comments made by partners who were not the ultimate arbiters. 94 The
commenting partners had direct access to and influence over the final
decisionmakers and were, thus, considered to be part of the
decisionmaking process.9 5
While the Third and Fourth Circuits have consistently applied the
animus-plus position, other circuits have chosen to apply it periodically,
including the Eighth, Seventh, and D.C. Circuits. 96 In Thomas v. NFL
1995); Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 259.
89 See Walden, 126 F.3d at 515-16. The Walden court agreed with the plaintiffs
contention that "those who have direct access to the decisionmakers and are likely to
influence their decision should be considered persons in the 'decisionmaking process."' Id.
at 514-15. The Walden court found, however, that the decisionmaker's allegedly retaliatory
statements were made a year before the plaintiff was fired and, therefore, were too remote
in time to constitute direct evidence. Id. at 515.
90 See supra note 89 and accompanying text.
91 See Walden, 126 F.3d at 515 (finding alleged discriminatory statement vague and
unconnected to any specific participant in decision).
92 Id.
93 See Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 234-38, 250-52, 255-58 (emphasizing critical
role partners' comments played in ultimate employment decision).
94 Id. at 234-38, 255-58.
95 Id. at 250-52.
96 See, e.g., Sheehan v. Donlen Corp., 173 F.3d 1039, 1044-46 (7th Cir. 1999)
(characterizing evidence as direct even if falls short of admission of illegal motivation);
Deneen v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 132 F.3d 431, 436 (8th Cir. 1998) (finding remarks
made contemporaneously and directly in connection with adverse employment decision are
direct evidence); Thomas v. NFL Players Ass'n, 131 F.3d 198, 203-05 (D.C. Cir. 1997)
(stating direct evidence may be circumstantial in nature provided that evidence establishes
discriminatory motive). The Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit has asserted that "Justice
O'Connor's invocation of direct evidence is not intended to disqualify circumstantial
evidence nor to require that the evidence signify [the discriminatory animus] without
inference." Thomas, 131 F.3d at 204.
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Players Ass'n,97 the D.C. Circuit aptly pointed to the fact that the

decisionmakers who had denied Ann Hopkins a partnership never admitted
or expressly stated that the adverse decision was based on her sex. 98
Rather, both the plurality and the concurring Justices made their decisions
based on sex-stereotyping evaluations and statements made by partners
who were not the ultimate decisionmakers. 99 The mixed-motive burden
under the animus-plus position is distinguishable from the classic position
in its method of applying the rule of law drawn from the plurality opinion
of Price Waterhouse. °° While both standards are stringent, the classic
position's outright bar of circumstantial evidence places a much heavier
evidentiary burden on the plaintiff than does the animus-plus "substantial
factor" burden.' 0 '
C. The "Animus" Position

Circuits taking the animus approach to the direct evidence
requirement do not bar any type of evidence, whether it be characterized as
direct or circumstantial, so long as it is tied to the alleged discriminatory
animus.' 0 2 According to the animus position, it is not even necessary that

97 131 F.3d 198 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
98 Thomas, 131 F.3d at 204; See also, Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 235-37.
99 Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 235-37, Thomas, 131 F.3d at 204. The D.C. Circuit

has applied the animus-plus approach by characterizing evidence as direct when it "shows
that an unlawful consideration constituted a substantial factor in the particular employment
decision." Thomas, 131 F.3d at 204. Consistent with the other animus-plus circuits, the
D.C. Circuit does not bar the use of circumstantial evidence in proving a mixed-motive case
as long as the evidence establishes that a discriminatory motive played a substantial role in
the employment decision. Id. at 204-05. The court, quoting a previous decision, stated that
"the distinction between direct and circumstantial evidence has no direct correlation with
the strength of [a] plaintiff's case." Id. at 204 (quoting Crawford-El v. Britton, 93 F.3d 813,
818 (D.C. Cir. 1996)). The Thomas court emphasized this point in stating that it is a
misreading of Justice O'Connor's use of the term "direct evidence" to interpret the term as
non-inferential or non-circumstantial. Id. at 204. The Thomas court stated that:
The purported distinction between "circumstantial" or "inferential" and "direct"
evidence.., does not make logical sense, because the decision to shift the burden
of persuasion properly rests upon the strength of the plaintiffs evidence of
discrimination, not the contingent methods by which that evidence is adduced.
Such a distinction is incompatible with both the facts and logic of Price
Waterhouse.

Id.

100 See supra notes 93-99 and accompanying text.
101 See Thomas, 131 F.3d at 205 (finding non-inferential definition of direct evidence
too strict); see also, Venters v. City of Delphi, 123 F.3d 956, 973 (7th Cir. 1997) (holding
evidence which falls short of virtual admission of illegality may still constitute direct
evidence).
102 See Fernandes v. Costa Bros. Masonry, Inc., 199 F.3d 572, 582 (1st
Cir. 1999).
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the evidence bear squarely on the challenged employment decision.' 0 3 The
circuits that adopt the animus position maintain that the other available
approaches' inflexible standards are the result of a misinterpretation of the
fragmented decision in Price Waterhouse. 104
The Second Circuit, being the chief circuit to take the animus
position, has taken special notice of the fact that Price Waterhouse was a
plurality decision. 105 While it is true that concurring opinions in a plurality
decision can be viewed as part of the Court's holding, the Second Circuit
recognizes that Justice O'Connor's direct evidence requirement was
adopted neither by the plurality decision nor by Justice White, who wrote
the only other concurrence. 106 Therefore, while stressing that the technical
majority of the Court did not support the direct evidence proposition but
acknowledging that "most of the circuits have engrafted this requirement
into caselaw," the Second Circuit has found that it is necessary to reach a
reasonable common ground. 107 Further, the animus circuits maintain that
even if the circuits were to unanimously derive a direct evidence
requirement from the Price Waterhouse decision, not even Justice
O'Connor commanded a strict non-inferential definition of the term. 108
The Second Circuit asserts that the non-circumstantial definition of
direct evidence poses a basic problem: under the non-circumstantial
touchstone, "direct evidence of intent cannot exist, at least in the sense of
evidence which, if believed, would establish the ultimate issue of intent to
discriminate."' 9 Animus circuits stress that employment discrimination
103 See

id.

104See Tyler v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 958 F.2d 1176, 1183 (2d Cir. 1992)

(emphasizing direct evidence requirement not adopted by plurality or concurring opinions).
105Id. at 1182-83.
'06 id. at 1183.
107 See Tyler, 958

F.2d at 1183 (expressing frustration with "splintered" reasoning of

Supreme Court in Price Waterhouse). The Tyler court emphasized the necessity of finding a
common ground shared by the justices in the fragmented Price Waterhouse opinions. Id. at
1182. Acknowledging that it is the court's duty to following the holding of the Supreme
Court, the Tyler court concluded that they "are thus left with the unenviable task of divining
the rationale of a Court which in fact had no single ratio decidendi." Id.
108See, e.g., Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 277 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring) (defining
direct evidence negatively); Tyler, 958 F.2d at 1183-84 (citing numerous cases following
negative, less stringent definition); Beshears v. Communications Services, Inc., 930 F.2d
1348, 1354 (8th Cir. 1991) (applying Justice O'Connor's less strict negative definition).
This position can be attributed to Justice O'Connor's assertion that:
Where an individual disparate treatment plaintiff has shown by a preponderance of the
evidence that an illegitimate criterion was a substantial factor in an adverse employment
decision, the deterrent purpose of the [discrimination] statute has clearly been triggered.
More importantly, as an evidentiary matter, a reasonable factfinder could conclude absent
further explanation, the employer's discriminatory motivation "caused" the employment
decision.
concurring).
Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 265 (O'Connor, J.,
109 Tyler, 958 F.2d at 1183.
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cases, like any other civil litigation cases, adhere to the conventional rule
that plaintiffs may prove their cases by direct or circumstantial evidence. " 0
It is the premise of the animus position that "requiring direct evidence [in
terms of non-circumstantial evidence] as a precondition to shifting the
mixed-motive analysis runs afoul of more general evidentiary
principles.""' Under the "animus only" theory, 2circumstantial evidence is
of no less probative value than direct evidence. "
In Tyler v. Bethlehem Steel Corp.,1 3 the Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit concluded that the plaintiff produced enough evidence to
gain access to a mixed-motive jury instruction even though the
decisionmaker made no discriminatory statements in connection with the
contested decision. 4 The Tyler court held that "if there is no "smoking
gun" in [the plaintiff's] case, there is at the very least a thick cloud of
smoke, which is certainly enough to require [the employer] to convince the
factfinder that, 'despite the smoke, there is no fire.""' 5 The Tyler court's
reference to a "smoking gun" is a well known analogy in evidentiary
terminology that connotes the highest form of proof that a plaintiff can
present.116 "Animus-only" circuits stress that such a high standard of proof
110 See id. at 1184.
III Id.
112

See id. (emphasizing well-established general evidentiary principles that jury can

rely on circumstantial and direct evidence).
"' 958 F.2d 1176 (2nd Cir. 1992).
114 Tyler, 958 F.2d at 1178-79, 1187.
After twenty-six years of service, the Tyler
plaintiff was notified that his office was being closed, resulting in the plaintiff losing his
job. Id. at 1178. The plaintiff requested a transfer and was informed by the decisionmaker
that there were no transfer openings. Id. During trial, the plaintiff presented evidence that
there were, in fact, transfer openings at the time he made the request, and that 13 younger
employees were eventually given those positions. Id. at 1179. Testimony further revealed
that the company based the transfer decis.ons on several factors, many of them relating to
the youthful age of the employee. Id. Faced with this evidence, the decisionmaker
explained that the demographics of the company were "getting older" and that he had to
compensate for the continually aging sales force. Id. at 1179.
15 Tyler, 958 F.2d at 1187 (quoting Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 266 (O'Connor,
J.,
concurring)). The Tvler court concluded that the jury can look to direct or circumstantial
evidence to reach its determination of whether discrimination was a substantial motivating
factor in the employment decision. Id. at 1186 (emphasis added). Asserting that this is the
best way to charge a jury when the contested issue is intentional discrimination, the court
emphasized that "anything more complex would mire the court in the hopeless task of
distinguishing "direct" from "circumstantial" evidence in addition to the already complex
task of determining discrimination." Id. at 1187.
116 See, e.g., Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 266 (using smoking gun analogy); Tyler,
958 F.2d at 1187 (using smoking gun analogy); Lockhart v. Westinghouse Credit Corp.,
879 F.2d 43, 48 (3rd Cir. 1989) (referring to smoking gun analogy). The term "smoking
gun" has been used by the courts as an analogy for the best kind of direct evidence. See
Tyler, 958 F.2d at 1187. An early use of the term can be found in Haupt v. United States,
wherein Justice Jackson declared:
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is not necessary to demonstrate that, more likely than not, decisionmakers
considered an impermissible factor in their employment decision." 7
D. The First Circuit'sPosition
The First Circuit stands among the few circuits that have yet to
adhere to one of the three developing positions." 8 Unlike the other
undecided circuits, which have chosen to flip back and forth between
different positions, the First Circuit has gradually progressed from one
position to another." t9 While none of the Appeals Court decisions have
firmly established the First Circuit as adhering to one position or the other,
it appears that the First Circuit has evolved from the classic position to the
less rigid animus-plus position. 20
The First Circuit initially approached the direct evidence question in
Jackson v. Harvard University,'21 wherein the court interpreted the newly
emerged direct evidence concept as limited to "evidence which, in and of
itself, shows a discriminatory animus.'1 22
This definition, which falls
within the classic position, was subsequently dismissed by the First Circuit
as a piece of circular reasoning that does nothing to provide a better
understanding of the term. 23 Foreshadowing the First Circuit's turn away
from the classic position, Senior circuit Judge Bownes's concurrence in

One witness might... see a smoking gun in the hand of [the] defendant and
see the victim fall. Another might be deaf, but see the defendant raise and
point the gun, and see a puff of smoke from it. The testimony of both
would certainly be to the same overt act,. . and each would be to the overt
act of shooting, although neither saw the movement of the bullet from the
gun to the victim...but it is not required that testimony be so minute as to
exclude every fantastic hypothesis that can be suggested.
Haupt v. United States, 330 U.S. 631 (1947).
117 See Kerns v. Capital Graphics, Inc., 178 F.3d 1011, 1017 (8th Cir. 1999). The
Kerns court found that "[direct] evidence might include proof of an admission that gender
was the reason for an action, discriminatory references to the particular employee in the
work context, or stated hostility to women being in the workplace at all." Id.
118See Fernandes v. Costa Bros. Masonry, Inc., 199 F.3d 572, 582-83 (1st Cir. 1999)
(refusing to choose among conflicting approaches).
19
120

See id. at582.

Compare Febres v. Challenger Caribbean Corp. , 214 F.3d 57 (1st Cir. 2000)

(rejecting narrow definitions of direct evidence, favoring more measured approach), with
Smith v. F.W. Morse & Co., Inc., 76 F.3d 413 (1st Cir. 1996) (defining direct evidence
narrowly), and Jackson v. Harvard Univ., 900 F.2d 464 (1st Cir. 1990) (adopting strictest
definition of direct evidence).
121 900 F.2d 464, 467 (1st Cir. 1990).
122 Jackson v. Harvard Univ., 900 F.2d 464, 467 (1st Cir. 1990).
123 See Smith v. F.W. Morse & Co., Inc., 76 F.3d 413, 431 (1st Cir. 1996) (Bownes, J.,
concurring) (describing Jackson court's reasoning as circular and un-explanatory).
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Smith v. F.W. Morse & Co., Inc.124 eschewed the First Circuit's approach
by dismissing the125aforementioned description as not only circular, but
entirely too strict.
Soon after the Smith decision, the court moved further away from
the classic position and closer to a more measured approach. 26 In
Fernandes,the court acknowledged that it had come to fully recognize the
dilemma posed by the existence of the conflicting approaches to the direct
evidence requirement.127 Although Judge Selya analyzed the circuit
conflict, he nonetheless concluded that the Fernandes case did not require
the court to adhere
to one of the positions, and left the issue unresolved in
128
the First Circuit.
In Febres v. Challenger Caribbean Corp.129 the court resolved to
take "an incremental step along the decisional path" a mere six months
after deciding Fernandes.130
Citing multiple animus-plus appellate
opinions, Judge Selya's Febres opinion significantly altered the position
held by the Fernandes majority.'13 The court came to the conclusion that a
124 76 F.3d 413, 431 (1st Cir. 1996).
125

Smith, 76 F.3d at 429-33 (Bownes, J., concurring). Holding that the plaintiff had

failed to produce direct evidence of gender discrimination, the Smith majority took the
classic position by defining direct evidence in terms of smoking gun proof, such as an
admission by the employer. Id. at 421. Disagreeing with this definition, but deferring to the
District Court's findings of fact, Judge Bownes wrote a concurring opinion in Smith that
detailed his disagreement with the analysis the court used to come to its conclusion. Id at
429-33. Judge Bownes expressed that the Supreme Court and subsequent circuit precedent
had imposed too heavy a burden on plaintiffs trying to prove the ultimate issue in mixedmotive discrimination cases. Id. at 430. Pointing out that a certain amount of inferencedrawing is necessary in any case, Judge Bownes proclaimed that the courts should "adopt a
definition of direct evidence...which satisfies the minimum negative requirements Justice
O'Connor set out in Price Waterhouse." Id. at 433; see also, Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at
277 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (establishing only what direct evidence does not include).
Judge Bownes considered such a definition to be the only one that actually renders the
mixed-motive framework a viable option for the employment discrimination plaintiff.
Smith, 76 F.3d at 433.
126 See Ayala-Gerena v. Bristol Myers-Squibb Co., 95 F.3d 86, 96 (1st
Cir. 1996).
Soon after the Smith decision, the First Circuit showed the first signs of backing down from
the classic position in Ayala-Gerena v. Bristol Meyers-Squibb Co. Id. Using the standard
evinced by Judge Bownes's concurrence in Smith, the Ayala court concluded that "resting
on conclusory allegations, improbable inferences, and unsupported speculation does not
suffice" to directly prove discriminatory animus. Id. at 97.
127See generallyFernandes, 199 F.3d 572.
128 See id. at 582-83.
29 214 F.3d 57 (1st Cir. 2000).
130 Febres v. ChallengerCaribbean Corp., 214 F.3d 57, 60 (1st Cir. 2000).
131 Compare Fernandes, 199 F.3d 572 (1st Cir. 1999), with Febres, 214 F.3d 57 (1st
Cir. 2000). In Fernandes,the court held that "a statement that plausibly can be interpreted
two different ways - one discriminatory and the other benign - does not directly reflect
illegal animus and, thus, does not constitute direct evidence." Fernandes, 199 F.3d at 583.
Conversely, the Febres court executed a 180 degree turn and reasoned that "the mere fact
that a fertile mind can conjure up some innocent explanation for [a suspicious] comment,
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narrower definition of direct evidence renders the mixed-motive
framework inaccessible unless the plaintiff can produce evidence of a blunt
admission from the employer. 132 This more measured approach illustrates
133
that the First Circuit presently takes a position in the animus-plus camp.
IV. ANALYSIS: THE FIRST CIRCUIT'S POSITION AS A UNIFYING
MODEL
Since 1964, Congress has proscribed discriminatory preference in
the workplace. 134 Congress has required, and the courts have enforced, the
removal of "artificial, arbitrary, and unnecessary barriers to employment
when the barriers operated invidiously to discriminate on the bases of...
impermissible classifications."' 135 Unfortunately, this goal has been curbed
by many of the Appeals Courts through36 their interpretations of Justice
O'Connor's direct evidence requirement.1
The Court has repeatedly stressed that, in the implementation of fair
and neutral employment decisions, "it is abundantly clear that [the law]
tolerates no.. .discrimination, subtle or otherwise."' 31 Significantly, both
the plurality and Justice O'Connor emphasized this edict in their Price
Waterhouse opinions. 38 Recognition by the courts that discrimination is
often a subtle and concealed practice is crucial to 39shaping the plaintiff's
burden of proof in employment discrimination law.'
Stricter interpretations of the direct evidence requirement essentially
leave many plaintiffs without a winnable case because discrimination is
does not undermine its standing as direct evidence." Febres, 214 F.3d at 61; see also,
Sheehan v. Donlen Corp., 173 F.3d 1039, 1044 (7th Cir. 1999) (observing term direct
evidence covers more than virtual admissions of illegality).
132Febres, 214 F.3d at 61. Judge Selya declared that "evidence is direct, and thus
justifies a mixed-motive jury instruction, when it consists of statements made by a
decisionmaker that directly reflect the alleged animus and bear squarely on the contested
employment decision - Id. at 60.
13 See id. at 60-61.
134See 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 701 et seq., 2000(e) et seq. (West 2000) (declaring
discrimination unlawful employment practice); see also, McDonnell Douglas Corp. v.
Green, 411 U.S. 792, 800 (1973). "The language of Title VII makes plain the purpose of
Congress to assure equality of employment opportunities and to eliminate those
discriminatory practices and devices which have fostered racially stratified job
environments to the disadvantage of minority citizens." Id.
135McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 801.
136See cases cited supra note 9.
137McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 801.
138 Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 243, 272 (1989).
139 See, e.g., Fernandes, 199 F.3d 572, 580, 581 (1st Cir. 1999) (highlighting
discrimination operates in subtle ways and noting important effect on outcome of
litigation); Smith v. F.W. Morse & Co., Inc., 76 F.3d 413, 430 (emphasizing plaintiffs face
discrimination at workplace as subtle as offensive); McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 801
(asserting Title VII clearly tolerates no discrimination, subtle or otherwise).
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predominantly perpetrated in subtle forms. 140 This fact is compounded by
the reality that employers often have multiple reasons behind their
employment decisions. 141 Therefore, a large majority of plaintiffs are left
without a remedy because most plaintiffs' cases fall under a mixed-motive
factual situation, but do not lead to the mixed-motive jury instruction due
to lack of direct evidence. 142 Those plaintiffs allowed to proceed under the
pretext instruction have a heavy burden to prove that the employer's
discriminatory motivation was the only true reason, especially after the
plaintiff has already acknowledged that there was more than one motive
for the adverse decision, at least one of them being legitimate. 143
This predicament principally arises from Justice O'Connor's failure
to clarify what form of proof the direct evidence standard requires14
While her opinion may have been vague on this most important matter,
however, Justice O'Connor should not shoulder all of the blame. 145 There
is ample guidance in both the plurality's and Justice O'Connor's opinions
which could lead a prudent reader toward a more feasible and effective
46
interpretation than what many of the Appeals Courts have produced. 1
The first and most apparent pieces of guidance that the Price
Waterhouse decision has to offer are the facts of the case. 147 The
decisionmakers at Price Waterhouse never told Anne Hopkins that she
would not be promoted because she is a woman.148 Nor did the partners,
on whose sex stereotyping comments the employer relied, suggest that Ms.
Hopkins should not be promoted because she is a woman.149 The evidence
that the plurality, including Justice O'Connor, focused on in holding the
Price Waterhouse defendants liable was "evidence that [the]
decisionmakers placed substantial negative reliance on an illegitimate
See cases cited supra note 138 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 236 (finding employer legitimately
emphasized interpersonal skills but impermissibly depended upon sex stereotypes); Febres
140

141

v. Challenger Caribbean Corp., 214 F.3d 57, 59 (1st Cir. 2000) (finding job performance,

union identification, and age as three criteria used to make employment decision); Tyler v.
Bethlehem Steel Corp., 958 F.2d 1176, 1178-80 (2nd Cir. 1992) (finding initial termination
due to office closing, subsequent refusal to transfer due to age discrimination).
142 See cases cited supra note 9.
143See cases cited supra note 9 and accompanying text.
144 See Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 261-79 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (stating
what
direct evidence does not include, failing to state what it includes).
145See id.
146 See

generally Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. 228.

The Price Waterhouse court,

concurrence and dissent included, wrote sixty-seven pages of opinion and analysis and went
into great detail analyzing the established legal frameworks and corresponding evidentiary
issues. See generally id.
141 See
148 See

id. at 231-37 (reiterating facts of case).
id. (finding partners made sex stereotyping comments, never literally said
reason based on gender).
149 See id.
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criterion in reaching their [adverse employment] decision."'' 50 This is
precisely what the First Circuit and other animus-plus circuits require that the plaintiff show that the employer's discriminatory animus is tied to
this interpretation follows
the adverse employment decision. 51 More so,
52
the only definition Justice O'Connor offered. 1
The courts must look at the totality of the circumstances when
evaluating whether discrimination took place. 53 Most of the cases
discussed in this Note illustrate that a finding of discrimination must be
deduced from separate pieces of evidence that, when viewed together,
expose that a discriminatory motive was behind the adverse employment
decision. 54 By limiting the type of evidence that mixed-motive plaintiffs
must produce to virtual admissions by the employer, the courts effectively
rob plaintiffs of a fair chance for compensation. 55 Maintaining a "proper
balance between employee rights and employer prerogatives" may not be a
simple task, but to tip the scales so radically in favor of the employer is to
eradicate the very purpose underlying the anti-discrimination statutes.156
When applying the direct evidence requirement, courts should bear in mind
that the anti-discrimination statutes were born from the recognition that the
economic 57
and power scales are tipped significantly in favor of the
employer.
The Price Waterhouse dissent suggested that the solution to the
mixed-motives/direct evidence problem would be to adhere solely to the
158
established evidentiary framework set forth by McDonnell Douglas.
The Price Waterhouse dissent argued that the mixed-motive framework
"provides limited practical benefits at the cost of confusion and
complexity."'5 9 While the dissent's prophesy that confusion would abound
among the lower courts was brought to fruition, the suggestion that the

150 Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 277 (O'Connor, J., concurring); see also, id. at 251.
151See cases cited supra notes 81-101, 125-32 and accompanying text.
152 Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 277 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice O'Connor
defined the term negatively in stating that direct evidence does not include "stray remarks..
., statements by nondecisionmakers, or statements by decisionmakers that are unrelated to
the [decision at issue]." Id.
153 See Dominguez-Cruz v. Suttle Caribe, Inc., 202 F.3d 424, 430 (1st Cir. 2000)
(looking at totality of evidence before determining the existence of direct evidence); Smith
v. F.W. Morse & Co., Inc., 76 F.3d 413, 421 (1st Cir. 1996) (emphasizing importance of
both quality and quantity of evidence).
See cases cited supra note 138 and accompanying text.
155See cases cited supra notes 72-80 and accompanying text.
156Price Waterhouse,490 U.S. at 239.
157See sources cited supra note 133 and accompanying text.
158 See generally McDonnell Douglas 411 U.S. 792; see also, Price Waterhouse, 490

U.S. at 279 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (urging continued adherence to McDonnell Douglas).
159 Price Waterhouse,490 U.S. at 279 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
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pretext framework remain the only one60available still leaves the problem
posed in Price Waterhouse unresolved. 1
The Court has emphasized that plaintiffs who acknowledge that the
employer had more than one reason for making the adverse employment
decision should not be forced to fit their claim into the pretext
framework.161 Courts that use the quality of evidence presented by the
plaintiff to differentiate between pretext and mixed-motive cases neglect
this important matter. 162 Plaintiffs should not be barred from any chance at
recovering damages simply because they are unfortunate enough to have
been discriminated against by an employer who had more than one reason
for treating them adversely. 163 Based on this sentiment, Congress amended
the Civil Rights Act in 1991 to provide that, upon a showing that
discrimination motivated any employment practice, an employer will be
held liable regardless of other motivational factors that may have
accompanied the practice.64
Unfortunately, while it is noble of Congress to demand that those
who have been proven to be discriminators pay for their offense regardless
of legitimate motives that may have accompanied it, this gesture has
achieved the opposite of its objective. 165 Upon nullifying the aspect of the
Price Waterhouse decision which allowed a defendant to avoid liability by
proving that they would have made the same decision absent the
160 See id. at 240, 246-47 (recognizing mixed-motive cases like plaintiffs do not fit

into McDonnell Douglas'spretext framework).
161 See Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 246-47. The Price Waterhouse plurality balked
at the suggestion that a mixed-motives plaintiff "must squeeze her proof into Burdine's
framework." Id. Instead, the plurality announced that "where a decision was the product of
a mixture of legitimate and illegitimate motives. . ., it simply makes no sense to ask whether
the legitimate reason was the 'true reason."' Id. at 247.
2 See cases cited supra notes 72-80 and accompanying text; see also, Price
Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 260. In his Price Waterhouse concurrence, Justice White
emphasized that there is a more fundamental difference between the two cases:
The Court has made clear that mixed-motive cases, such as [Price
Waterhouse] are different from pretext cases such as McDonnell Douglas.
In pretext cases, "the issue is whether either illegal or legal motives, but not
both, were the 'true' motives behind the decision." In mixed-motive cases,
however, there is no one "true" motive behind the decision. Instead, the
decision is a result of multiple factors, at least one of which is legitimate.
Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 260 (quoting NLRB v. Transportation Management Corp.,

262 U.S. 393 (1983)).

163 See cases cited supra note 9 and accompanying text.
'64 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2(m) (West 1991). §2000e-2(m) provides in pertinent part,

"...an unlawful employment practice is established when the complaining party
demonstrates that race, color, religion, sex, or national origin was a motivating factor for
any employment practice, even though other factors also motivated the practice." Id.
165 See id.
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discriminatory motive, Congress essentially forced the courts to require the
plaintiff to overcome a nearly insurmountable burden of proof.166 Leaving
the defense with no real tool to rebut the plaintiff's allegations or to prove
that the alleged discriminatory motive took no part in the decision,
Congress has, in effect, created a strict liability framework against the
defendant. 67 Further, Congress, like Justice O'Connor, failed to offer
guidance as to the plaintiffs burden of proof. 68 Left with little direction
as to what degree of evidence will trigger a mixed-motive jury instruction
and caught between Justice O'Connor's direct evidence requirement and
Congress's mandate in the 1991 Act, the courts are put in the awkward
position of respecting employee rights while preventing the chilling effect
that Congress's framework could have over the rubric of employment.169
The situation, however, is far from hopeless. The First Circuit,
recognizing the complexities involved in this predicament, has come up
with a workable scheme that is fair for both parties. 70 In Febres v.
Challenger CaribbeanCorp., the First Circuit looked to several factors to
determine whether the evidence presented could be categorized as direct.' 7'
These factors included: 1) whether the discriminatory statement was made
by the decisionmaker, 2) whether the statement/s pertained to the
decisional process, 3) whether the statement/s bore squarely on the
employment decision at issue, 4) whether the statement/s straightforwardly
conveyed discriminatory animus, and 5) given these72attributes, whether the
statement can be dismissed as a mere stray remark.
The First Circuit's framework presents a unifying approach that
brings together the Price Waterhouse plurality decision, including Justice
O'Connor's concurrence, and the varying circuit positions. 173 Following
the Court's mandate in Price Waterhouse, employers who can legitimately
offer multiple reasons for an adverse employment decision will not
automatically escape liability if the plaintiff can prove, through the
carefully orchestrated Febres factors, that at least one of those reasons was

166

167

See id.; see also, notes 72-80 and accompanying text.
See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e to 2000e-17 (West 2000); see also, notes 87-107 and

accompanying text.
See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e to 2000e-17 (omitting language pertaining to form of
evidence required to prove violation of Act).
169 See Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 239.
170 See Febres v. Challenger Caribbean Corp., 214 F.3d 57, 61 (1st Cir. 2000)
(detailing attributes of statements not dismissible as stray remarks).
"' See id. at 61-62 (developing factors while sifting through pertinent facts of case).
172 Febres, 214 F.3d at 60-62. After going through this analytical process, the Febres
decision established that "comments which, fairly read, demonstrate that a decisionmaker
made, or intended to make, employment decisions based on forbidden criteria, constitute
direct evidence of discrimination." Id. at 60-61.
173 See cases and sources cited supra notes 37-43, 47-66 and accompanying text.
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discriminatory in nature. 74 By ensuring that the discriminatory animus is
directly tied to the adverse employment decision, the Febres process
satisfies Justice O'Connor's proviso without eliminating the consideration
of pertinent circumstantial proof. 75 This scheme preserves the mixedmotive framework as a viable option for plaintiffs but does not menace the
defendants with strict liability. 176 It satisfies the more stringent circuits'
demand for as little inference as possible, yet it opens the door to more
evidence and an examination of the totality of the circumstances, as
required by the more relaxed circuits. 177 The Supreme Court would be
wise to revisit the direc~t evidence question with this practicable framework
as their guide. 178 Continuing to allow this poorly developed evidentiary
requirement to wreak havoc on all those involved in employment
discrimination cases is a clear abdication of the Supreme Court's
"responsibility to the institutions and parties depending on it for
179
direction."'
V.

CONCLUSION

The failure of the Court and the legislature to provide adequate
guidance on the application of the direct evidence requirement in mixedmotive employment discrimination cases has created confusion among the
courts. This confusion has caused wronged plaintiffs to go uncompensated
and culpable defendants to go unpunished. These injustices cannot be
permitted to continue, and it is the Supreme Court's obligation to ensure
that they do not.
The First Circuit's approach to the direct evidence requirement
provides a workable and fair procedure for the Supreme Court to adopt
upon a long-overdue review of the direct evidence question. The Febres
factors allow the mixed-motive framework to remain a viable option,
which is completely necessary in the present day, wherein employer's
know better than to make their discrimination obvious. In the end, no
matter what framework the Court chooses, it is crucial that the Court

174See Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 258 (finding defendant must prove it would
have made same decision not taking gender into account); Febres, 214 F.3d at 61
(developing factors when considering whether evidence direct).
175See Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 261-79 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring); Febres, 214
F.3d at 60-6 1.
176 See Febres, 214 F.3d at 60-61 (providing workable scheme to determine ultimate
issue of discrimination in mixed-motive case).
177See cases cited supra notes 47-71 and accompanying text.

178 See id.
179Tyler, 958 F.2d at 1182 (quoting PluralityDecisions andJudicialDecisionmaking,

94 HAv. L. REV. 1127. 1128 (1981)).
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discrimination, "subtle or otherwise."
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law tolerates no

Elissa R. Hoffman

180McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 801.

